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filed objections to the report. Prior to any hearings on the objections,
the United States sold the property by sealed bid auction in 1995 to
John and Maeta McCray without the appurtenant water rights.
The McCray's took the United States' place in the subcases and
filed a motion for summary judgment arguing the property had been
irrigated in both 1985 and 1990. On February 27, 1998, a special
master appointed by the SRBA District Court, determined the water
rights on the eastern portion of the property had been abandoned
when Storer filled in the ditches and installed the sprinkler system.
The special master also held the water rights for the entire property
had been forfeited due to nonuse, but excluded the twenty-five acres
irrigated in 1990. Finally, the special master concluded Shane
Rosenkrance's use of Alder Creek water on his own property in 1991
and 1992 did not constitute water rights resumption on the Storer
property. The special master gave her report to the SRBA District
Court Judge, who adopted the recommendations entirely. The
McCrays filed their notice of appeal on September 17, 1999.
The McCray's alleged conditions beyond the control of the water
right holder caused the abandonment or forfeiture.
Wrongful
interference with a water right or failure to use the water because of
circumstances over which the water right holder has no control is a
defense to forfeiture. According to the McCray's, the 1990 irrigator
wanted to irrigate more than the twenty-five acres, but could not
because of lack of water and the watermaster's wrongful diversion of
the water to his own land. The special master concluded that the
watermaster's actions did not wrongly interfere with the water rights
because the 1990 irrigator failed to call for the water when he
discovered Alder Creek water was no longer flowing to his property.
In addition, the special master relied on testimony from the 1990
irrigator that the property was not set up for gravity irrigation, and
therefore, could not have been irrigated.
The Idaho Supreme Court applied a substantial and competent
evidence standard and affirmed the district court's decision that water
rights 34-00600 and 34-00606 were abandoned and forfeited to all but
twenty-five acres. The court also rejected the McCray's argument that
Shane Rosenkrance resumed the water rights because they failed to
prove that any water was put to beneficial use anywhere other than on
Rosenkrance's property.
M. Elizabeth Lokey
MISSOURI
Chance v. Pub. Water Supply Dist., 41 S.W.3d 523 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001)
(holding detachment of property from Public Water Supply District
No. 16 ("District") was proper under applicable Missouri statutes,
federal statutes were inapplicable, and detachment would not have a
significant adverse effect on the remainder of the District).
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Scott and Janice Chance decided to divide their property into two
lots. Their home was on one lot served by the City of Independence's
("City") water system. Both the City and Public Water Supply District
No. 16 ("District") had water mains next to the second lot. Due to the
poor condition in which the District left their property after installing
a six-inch water line, the Chances decided to seek service for the
second lot from the City. The City refused to serve the second lot
unless they petitioned for detachment from the District. The District
challenged the Circuit Court of Jackson County's order that the
Chances' property, located in that county, be detached from the
District. The main issues were whether detachment from the District
was proper, whether the City could legally supply the water, and
whether the detachment would adversely affect the rest of the District.
The Missouri Court of Appeals held the circuit court did not err in
detaching the Chances' property from the District, because the federal
statute the District relied on did not apply. The District argued a
federal statute protected it from detachment because it was a
participant or party to a $5 million loan from the United States
Department of Agriculture. The court found the loan was a new
project loan that was not made to the District. Therefore, the statute
was not applicable and did not protect the District from detachment of
the Chances' property. In the absence of that protection, Missouri
statutes provide that voters residing in the District's territory may
petition the circuit court for detachment. Therefore, the City's supply
of water to the property was proper under established statutory
interpretation. The court also held the circuit court did not abuse its
discretion in finding the detachment did not to amount to a
significant adverse effect on the remainder of the District.
The District argued it had an exclusive right to supply water to the
Chances' second lot. The court disagreed and found that under
another Missouri statute, cities may supply water to properties inside a
water district's territory. As a result, the District did not have an
exclusive right to supply water.
Finally, the District argued the Chances failed to prove detachment
would not have an adverse effect on the remainder of the District, as
required under relevant Missouri statutes. The court again disagreed,
and decided that one residential water connection does not generate
enough income to amount to a significant adverse effect on the
remainder of the district.
Willow Morrow
Willamette Indus. v. Clean Water Comm'n, 34 S.W.3d 197 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2000) (holding Willamette Industries' petition should be denied,
pending exhaustion of administrative remedies, because the permit's
special conditions did not constitute rulemaking, and, thus, were not
an exception to the Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Doctrine).

